A Data Center Digest Original StoryThis article was researched and written entirely by AI, without human review or editing, as part of the Data Center Digest's ongoing experiment in AI-powered journalism.
On September 8, 2026, Representative Suhas Subramanyam, a Virginia Democrat, introduced what he calls a National Data Center Plan: four bills covering where data centers are built, how their energy and water use is measured, who pays for the grid upgrades they need, and how to protect nearby communities from foreign threats. It is the nearest thing in Congress to a national strategy, and its siting piece is guidance, not a requirement. The Digest found no executive branch document that calls itself a national data center strategy. What the federal government has instead is a set of separate moves: orders that speed approvals, deals on federal land, a grid regulator still deciding how large loads connect, and 61 bills that the Digest tracks, of which one has passed a chamber.
What Washington has done so far
The main executive action is Executive Order 14318, signed July 23, 2025. It covers projects that need more than 100 megawatts of new load for AI work. It tells agencies to find existing exclusions from environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act, allows projects to be placed on the federal permitting dashboard under the FAST-41 process, and has the Interior, Energy and Defense departments offer federal land, including leases at military installations. It also gives EPA 180 days to issue guidance on reusing brownfield and Superfund sites. The order’s stated priority is “the rapid and efficient buildout” of the infrastructure. It speeds federal approvals and points to federal land and former industrial sites, but it sets no national rules for where projects must or must not go.
On siting authority, the administration has so far left the decision with the states. Executive Order 14365, signed December 11, 2025, directs the White House to draft legislation overriding many state AI laws, but says the proposal “shall not propose preempting” state laws on “AI compute and data center infrastructure, other than generally applicable permitting reforms.” The framework the White House sent Congress in March 2026, as Governing reported it, asks for faster permitting and for protection of households from higher power costs, and leaves state zoning power in place.
Federal land is the administration’s most direct lever. The Energy Department picked four of its sites in July 2025 for private AI data center and power projects: Idaho National Laboratory, Oak Ridge Reservation, the Paducah site in Kentucky and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. In late July 2026 two of them moved. DOE selected Brookfield to develop a 1.8-gigawatt campus at Paducah, with NextEra planning a 2-gigawatt gas plant and more than $100 billion in private investment expected, and the National Nuclear Security Administration chose Amentum to negotiate a lease for a 1-gigawatt campus at Savannah River, which is not final. Critics have pushed back. Senator Ron Wyden’s S. 5658 would ban selling or transferring federal public land for new data centers. His office says Senate Republicans blocked a request for fast passage on September 30, and it cites reporting that the administration is weighing more than 17,000 acres in six Western states for 12 data centers, which the release describes as under consideration.
The grid is where Washington has come closest to national rules, and it is contested. On October 23, 2025, Energy Secretary Chris Wright directed FERC to assert jurisdiction over connecting large loads, those above 20 megawatts, to the high-voltage grid and to set standard procedures. State utility commissions have historically handled that job, and the proposal said it would leave states’ authority over retail sales and generation siting alone. The Secretary asked for final action by April 30, 2026. FERC did not issue a single national rule. On June 18, 2026, it ordered six regional grid operators to file a report within 30 days and, within 60 days, to justify their current tariffs or file changes on five topics, including cost shifting, co-located power plants and flexible large loads. The rulemaking remains open.
What Congress has
As of the Digest’s November 9 data pull, 61 federal bills mention data centers. By a keyword count of titles and descriptions, about a dozen deal with ratepayer protection or who pays for grid costs, and more than 20 deal with disclosure or reporting. Only two, by the Digest’s reading, direct a federal agency to study or set guidance on where data centers should go: Subramanyam’s H.R. 10321 and H.R. 10041, a Commerce Department study of sites near military installations, rail hubs, airports and industrial zones.
Costs have moved furthest. H.R. 9340, the Ratepayer Protection Act, passed the House 417 to 3 on September 16, 2026. It would require state regulators to consider standards, for loads over 100 megawatts, that make large users cover the full incremental cost of new generation and grid upgrades. It does not require states to adopt them. In the Senate, Republican Jon Husted asked to pass it by unanimous consent and Democrat Martin Heinrich blocked the request. Heinrich, the top Democrat on the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, has said the bill does not go far enough and wants rules on community engagement, water use and air pollution as well.
A bipartisan Senate bill introduced September 30 by Heinrich, Mike Lee, Shelley Moore Capito and Sheldon Whitehouse takes a different route. It would widen FERC’s power to approve certain interstate transmission lines and would require data centers of 20 megawatts or more to pay the full transmission and incremental costs of serving them, without passing those costs to other customers. It still needs committee action.
Subramanyam’s package covers more of what a strategy would include. The siting bill, H.R. 10321, would have the Energy Secretary, consulting FERC and the Defense Secretary, publish best practices within a year of enactment and revise them at least every two years. The factors include grid and transmission effects, water, noise and light, workforce, tax revenue and national security, including the risk of several data centers in one place, and the practices would name “ideal locations.” The text places no requirements on developers, states or localities. A second bill, H.R. 10322, would require data centers and other large energy users to pay the full cost of the grid and generation upgrades built for them, and would cut highway funds to states that do not adopt large-load tariffs. A third, H.R. 9372, has the National Institute of Standards and Technology develop standards for measuring data center energy and water use. A fourth, H.R. 8711, calls for a strategy to protect communities near data infrastructure from adversaries.
Another House bill points the other way. H.R. 10119, introduced August 20 by Republican Tom Barrett, would bar federal agencies from overriding state or local land-use, zoning, siting or permitting authority over data centers on non-federal land, and from conditioning federal funds on a state or locality giving up that authority.
The questions a strategy would have to answer
Read together, the proposals show what a national strategy would have to decide: where data centers go, how they are built, who pays, and who decides.
Where is the least settled. Current federal policy steers projects toward federal land and former industrial sites, and the one proposal for broader guidance is non-binding. A report published August 11, 2026 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies recommends encouraging development on brownfields, former industrial sites, federal property and places with existing energy and fiber, and argues that planned siting can cut permitting delays.
How they are built has so far been mostly a matter of measurement and reporting. The NIST bill would create measurement standards, and the disclosure bills would add reporting. On reliability, FERC ordered the North American Electric Reliability Corporation on July 16 to submit the first enforceable standards for computational loads by December 31, 2026.
Who pays has the most momentum, through the House-passed bill, the bipartisan Senate bill and FERC’s June orders. Who decides is the hardest. Land use has been a state and local matter, the White House framework keeps zoning with the states, and DOE’s request that FERC take over large-load connections reaches into a field that state commissions have historically held.
What other countries have tried
China has the longest record with a national siting plan. Introduced at the end of 2020 by four agencies, its “Eastern Data, Western Computing” program designates eight national computing hubs, three in the east and five in the west, and ten data center clusters. Power-hungry facilities were meant to go west, closer to renewable energy, while latency-sensitive work stayed near eastern cities. Targets included latency under 20 milliseconds for clusters, average availability of at least 65 percent and power usage effectiveness below 1.25.
Results are disputed. A July 10, 2026 ChinaTalk analysis argues that compute has not moved west in any meaningful way. It cites a Chinese state press report on a western computing center whose servers ran below 30 percent utilization, and says electricity was only about 5 percent of three-year costs at one 400-megawatt facility, so power prices did not decide where capacity went. It also points to skilled labor concentrated in the north, east and south. The plan itself assigns latency-sensitive work to the east and heavier, delay-tolerant work to the west, so how much of the western capacity is in use is the open question.
Germany, which like the United States divides power between federal and state governments, adopted its first national data center strategy on March 18, 2026. It aims to at least double capacity by 2030, calls for a concept of priority areas on brownfield sites such as former power stations, sets standardized siting criteria as a practical guide for local authorities, and looks at giving host municipalities a larger share of tax revenue. The law firm summary of the strategy lists no binding efficiency or waste-heat requirements, and says measures that need new federal money depend on funding. The European Commission separately proposed a Cloud and AI Development Act on June 3, 2026, aimed at speeding deployment across the EU.
Where the race stands
On one measure the United States is far ahead. The Brussels think tank Bruegel estimated in a September 10, 2026 brief that the United States holds about 35 gigawatts of operational AI compute, 78 percent of the world total, against about 5 gigawatts (11 percent) in China and 2 gigawatts (5 percent) in the EU. Planned projects would change those shares only modestly by 2031, to 68 percent for the United States, 15 percent for China and 6 percent for the EU. Bruegel’s subject is Europe, where it says speed to operation and grid access are the main limits and treats coordination among permitting authorities as the more binding constraint. These are one group’s estimates, and published figures for Chinese capacity vary.
The case for and against acting nationally
Supporters of a stronger federal role come at it from two directions that do not agree on what a strategy should do. One argues for speed. The executive order sets rapid buildout as a priority, CSIS calls domestic data centers increasingly a prerequisite for technology leadership, and House Speaker Mike Johnson and Majority Leader Steve Scalise urged Congress to act on the White House AI framework so the United States can beat China in the global AI race. The other argues for protection. Subramanyam’s package, Heinrich’s call for stronger rules and the bills on disclosure and community impact would use national standards to limit costs and harms to residents. Both treat Washington as the place to set terms. They differ on whether the terms should mainly clear the way or mainly set conditions.
Arguments for caution are also on the record. Land use has been a state and local matter, the administration’s own framework keeps zoning with the states, and H.R. 10119 would write that into law. In the Chinese record, as its critics read it, a plan built around power prices left capacity idle where demand and skilled workers were not. Germany’s strategy shows another possibility: a plan that is mostly guidance and depends on follow-through by states and towns. Wyden argues that Congress should act before the administration sets a precedent for handing public land to developers, and Heinrich’s objection shows that some who want national action think the House cost bill is too weak. Bruegel’s finding is a reminder that a strategy can stall on power and approvals even with a good siting list.
What to watch
The 119th Congress ends on January 3, 2027, and bills not enacted by then expire, so the Ratepayer Protection Act, the Senate affordability bill and the Subramanyam package must move in the lame-duck session or be reintroduced next year. FERC’s next step after the grid operators answer its June orders will show how much of the grid side becomes national and how much stays regional. NERC’s first-phase standards for computational loads are due December 31, 2026. The Paducah and Savannah River deals still have to clear negotiations and approvals.
Whether any of this becomes a single strategy is open. At present the federal government has a speed policy, a cost debate and one non-binding siting proposal, and no document that ties them together.